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Abstract
Recent years have seen a marked increase in the spread of misinformation, a phenomenon
which has been accelerated and amplified by social media such as Facebook and Twitter. While
some actors spread misinformation to push a specific agenda, it has also been widely documented
that others aim to simply disrupt the network by increasing disagreement and polarization across
the network and thereby destabilizing society. Popular social networks are also vulnerable to
large-scale attacks. Motivated by this reality, we introduce a simple model of network disruption
where an adversary can take over a limited number of user profiles in a social network with the
aim of maximizing disagreement and/or polarization in the network.
We investigate this model both theoretically and empirically. We show that the adversary
will always change the opinion of a taken-over profile to an extreme in order to maximize
disruption. We also prove that an adversary can increase disagreement / polarization at most
linearly in the number of user profiles it takes over. Furthermore, we present a detailed empirical
study of several natural algorithms for the adversary on both synthetic networks and real world
(Reddit and Twitter) data sets. These show that even simple, unsophisticated heuristics, such
as targeting centrists, can disrupt a network effectively, causing a large increase in disagreement
/ polarization. Studying the problem of network disruption through the lens of an adversary
thus highlights the seriousness of the problem.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a marked increase in the spread of misinformation, a phenomenon which
has been accelerated and amplified by social media such as Facebook and Twitter. This problem
has been widely studied empirically [3, 9, 13, 17, 19]. By and large, the main solution proposed to
tackle the spread of misinformation is to develop automated fake news detection tools (e.g., [18]).
However, there are huge challenges to overcome to make this viable. To start, simply defining what
is false vs. true is often controversial and by now has been hugely politicized. Moreover, rapid
advances in machine learning have made possible the creation of fake audio and video that are
convincingly realistic, hence the problem of detection will only become worse in the coming years.
In this paper we consider a completely different angle. While some actors spread misinformation
to push a specific agenda, it has also been widely documented [8, 16] that others aim to simply
disrupt the network by increasing disagreement and polarization across the network, thereby desta-
bilizing society. Popular social networks are also vulnerable to large-scale attacks—in September
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2018 it was revealed that nearly 50 million Facebook users were compromised in a data breach
where attackers had the ability to take over accounts [21]. Motivated by this reality, we introduce a
simple model of network disruption where an adversary can take over some user profiles in a social
network with the aim of maximizing disagreement and/or polarization in the network.
Does the adversary have to be sophisticated to cause significant disruption? Or can they achieve
their goal via simple, unsophisticated heuristics? How do the answers to these questions depend
on properties of the underlying social network? The goal of this paper is to study such questions.
By studying the problem through the lens of an adversary we are able to gain insight into the
seriousness of the problem.
1.1 An adversarial model of network disruption
Our key conceptual contribution is the introduction of a novel adversarial model of network disrup-
tion. We model the underlying social network as a weighted graph G = (V,E,w), where V is the
set of vertices, corresponding to the users of the social network, E is the set of edges, connecting
users who know each other, and w : E → [0, 1] is a weight function on the edges that describes the
strength of the ties between users. Now consider a topic that everyone has an opinion about—gun
ownership, the amount of taxation, or your favorite controversial topic. We assume that everyone
has an innate opinion about this topic and that this opinion can be quantified by a number in
the interval [0, 1]; for instance, 0 corresponds to strict gun control while 1 corresponds to no gun
control. The innate opinions are denoted by s = {sv}v∈V ∈ [0, 1]V .
People interact with their acquaintances on the social network and exchange opinions. As a
result, their opinions evolve and finally reach an equilibrium, which we denote by z = {zv}v∈V ∈
[0, 1]V . To be specific, in this paper we consider a simple model of opinion dynamics—known as the
Friedkin-Johnsen model [10]—where users iteratively update their opinions by taking a weighted
average of the opinions of their friends and their innate opinion. This results in the equilibrium
opinions being z = (I + L)−1 s, where I is the identity matrix and L is the (weighted) Laplacian
matrix. We emphasize that, while we focus on the Friedkin-Johnsen model in this paper, everything
we consider can be studied for other opinion dynamics models as well.
The equilibrium opinions z have various properties that we care about. Following [15], we
introduce the following two important quantities. Disagreement is defined as
D ≡ D(z) :=
∑
(u,v)∈E
wu,v (zu − zv)2 ; (1.1)
this measures how much acquaintances disagree in their opinions, globally across the network.
Polarization is defined as
P ≡ P (z) :=
∑
v∈V
(zv − z)2 (1.2)
where z := 1|V |
∑
v∈V zv is the mean opinion; in other words, P is the variance of the opinions,
multiplied by the number of vertices.
Modeling the adversary. We now turn to modeling network disruption, which is the key
new idea introduced in the paper. We consider an adversary who can take over k nodes of the
network and modify the innate opinions of these nodes arbitrarily. That is, the adversary can select
s′ ∈ [0, 1]V such that ‖s′ − s‖0 ≤ k. For instance, this can model a hacker who takes over a set
of Facebook profiles. The adversary does not want to raise suspicion and so the opinion dynamics
remain unchanged. Therefore, assuming the Friedkin-Johnsen model, the resulting equilibrium
opinions will be z′ = (I + L)−1s′ and these will result in new values of disagreement D′ and
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Figure 1: Schematic of the adversarial model of network disruption. Top: On a particular
topic everyone has an innate opinion, resulting in the innate opinion vector s ∈ [0, 1]V . These are
mapped to equilibrium opinions z ∈ [0, 1]V via the opinion dynamics. The equilibrium opinions give
rise to natural quantities: disagreement D and polarization P . Bottom: The adversary can take
over at most k nodes in the network and change their innate opinions, resulting in the new innate
opinion vector s′ ∈ [0, 1]V . The opinion dynamics are unchanged, resulting in new equilibrium
opinions z′ ∈ [0, 1]V , and subsequently new values of disagreement D′ and polarization P ′. The
goal of the adversary is to maximize disagreement and/or polarization.
polarization P ′. The goal of the adversary is to pick s′ in such a way that maximizes disagreement
D′ or polarization P ′. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Questions and challenges. What is the optimal solution for the adversary? That is, how
should they pick the set of k vertices to hack, and how should they set the innate opinions of hacked
vertices?
Our first result shows that any optimal solution will set the innate opinions to an extreme;
that is, if s′v 6= sv then s′v ∈ {0, 1}. Thus a brute force approach can find an optimal solution by
checking all
(
n
k
)
2k possibilities, where n denotes the number of vertices. This is not feasible when k
is large— so is there an efficient (polynomial time in n) algorithm to find an optimal solution? One
can show that the function that we are maximizing is not submodular or subadditive and hence
off-the-shelf methods/results do not apply directly.
Regardless if they can efficiently find an optimum or not, it may be argued that in some cases
knowing all the innate opinions exactly is unrealistic, and in other cases knowing the entire social
network structure is difficult. Can the adversary cause significant disruption knowing only the
network structure and nothing (or close to nothing) about the innate opinions, and vice versa?
Can simple heuristics perform well? How do the answers to these questions depend on properties
of the underlying social network? We investigate such questions in this paper.
1.2 Our results
Our first result is intuitive: no matter which set of vertices the adversary chooses, the optimal way
to modify the innate opinions of these nodes is to set them to one of the two extremes: 0 or 1. In
particular, we have the following result.
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Theorem 1.1. Consider the problem setup as above, with the adversary maximizing either dis-
agreement, polarization, or a conical combination of these two (i.e., a linear combination with
nonnegative coefficients). Let s′ be an optimum vector of innate opinions, given the constraints.
Assume that G has no isolated vertices. For every v ∈ V , if s′v 6= sv, then s′v ∈ {0, 1}.
This result follows from the convexity of the objective functions, together with the fact that the
adversary is maximizing the objective function. This implies that if the adversary has a budget of k
(i.e., it can take over at most k nodes), then a brute force approach can find an optimal solution by
checking all
(
n
k
)
2k possibilities, where n denotes the number of nodes. For constant k this gives a
polynomial-time algorithm, but it performs poorly as k grows. In fact, we conjecture that solving
the optimization problem of the adversary is computationally hard when k is large (e.g., k = nε).
Next, we examine quantitatively the effect that the adversary can have on disagreement and
polarization, both theoretically and empirically. First, we prove that the adversary can only increase
disruption linearly in k. Specifically, for the polarization objective we show that the increase is
always bounded above by 3k; this is the content of the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2 (Upper bound on the increase in polarization). Let G be a weighted graph and s a
vector of innate opinions such that the resulting equilibrium opinion vector z has polarization P .
Suppose that the adversary has a budget of k; that is, the adversary may select s′ ∈ [0, 1]|V | such
that ‖s′ − s‖0 ≤ k. Let P ′ be the polarization of the resulting equilibrium opinion vector z′ =
(I + L)−1 s′. Then
P ′ ≤ P + 3k.
For the disagreement objective, our result gives a bound of 8dmaxk, where dmax is the (weighted)
maximum degree. Thus for bounded-degree graphs this is still O(k).
Theorem 1.3 (Upper bound on the increase in disagreement). Let G be a weighted graph and s a
vector of innate opinions such that the resulting equilibrium opinion vector z has disagreement D.
Suppose that the adversary has a budget of k; that is, the adversary may select s′ ∈ [0, 1]|V | such
that ‖s′ − s‖0 ≤ k. Let D′ be the disagreement of the resulting equilibrium opinion vector z′ =
(I + L)−1 s′. Then
D′ ≤ D + 8dmaxk,
where dmax := maxv∈V
∑
u∈V wv,u is the (weighted) maximum degree.
These results lead to a natural question: can the adversary achieve an increase in these objective
functions that grows linearly with k? We show empirically, on both synthetic and real data sets,
that this is indeed the case.
We first consider a greedy algorithm, where the adversary iteratively selects nodes to take over,
in each iteration choosing the node, together with one of the two extreme opinions, that maximizes
the objective function. While this greedy algorithm is natural, it also uses detailed information:
specifically, it assumes knowledge of the network G and the innate opinions s. Since this may be
unrealistic in practice, we also consider simpler heuristics for the adversary.
One such heuristic, which we term the “mean opinion” heuristic, is to choose the node whose
(innate) opinion is closest to the mean and change it to one of the two extremes (either by optimizing
this choice or just randomly). Such a heuristic can easily be implemented approximately by an
adversary, since often it is possible to deduce whether someone has a centrist opinion by using
extra information available about the node. Another heuristic that we consider focuses on a simple
function of the underlying graph structure, iteratively choosing the largest degree nodes (in either
a weighted or unweighted sense) and changing their opinion to one of the two extremes. We also
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compare all the algorithms to a random baseline, where the adversary selects nodes randomly and
changes their opinions to random extremes.
We evaluate these algorithms on both synthetic and real data sets. For synthetic networks we
use three common probabilistic generative models: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs, the preferential
attachment model, and the stochastic block model. We also study Reddit and Twitter data sets
that were previously studied in [15].
Our main empirical finding is that in almost all settings—meaning, a network (synthetic or real,
as above), an algorithm (from the ones described above), and an objective function (disagreement,
polarization, or a linear combination)—the adversary succeeds in increasing its objective function
linearly in k. The rate of increase depends on the details: the greedy algorithm performs best
among these options, but the mean opinion heuristic is often not far behind. Even the random
baseline gives a linear increase in k in several (though not all) settings. The details of all our
experiments are in Section 5.
The key take-away from our results is that an adversary can significantly disrupt a network
using simple, unsophisticated methods. This mirrors recent findings analyzing real-world data; for
instance, the authors in [5] conclude that the Internet Research Agency’s operations to interfere
with the 2016 U.S. presidential election “were largely unsophisticated”. This adversarial approach
thus highlights the seriousness of problem and motivates further research into addressing it.
1.3 Related work
Opinion dynamics have been used in various disciplines to model social learning (see, e.g., the sur-
vey [14]). In seminal work, the DeGroot model describes how individuals reach a consensus through
stochastic interactions [7]. Friedkin and Johnsen extended this model to incorporate individuals’
intrinsic beliefs and prejudices [10]. In the Friedkin-Johnsen model, all agents have individual in-
nate opinion values, and as time goes on, agents interact with each other, updating their opinions
to be a weighted average of their innate opinion and the neighboring agents’ opinions. Eventually,
opinions converge to an equilibrium, which is a non-constant function of the innate opinions. This
latter property is an important reason why we use the Friedkin-Johnsen model for opinion dynam-
ics in this paper, in addition to its simplicity. The Friedkin-Johnsen model can be extended in a
variety of ways, for instance to incorporate stubbornness and susceptibility to persuasion [2].
Several recent works have studied various network interventions to influence opinions in cer-
tain ways. Gionis, Terzi, and Tsaparas [12] studied opinion maximization in social networks,
which corresponds to pushing a specific agenda. Abebe et al. [2] study a similar problem (opinion
maximization or minimization), but where interventions happen at the level of susceptibility to
persuasion.
In contrast, the work of Musco, Musco, and Tsourakakis [15]—which serves as the starting point
of our work—studies polarization and disagreement, which are quite different objectives. The goal
of their work is to minimize these quantities by changing the underlying network topology.
Our key conceptual contribution is to study the opposite objective: maximizing polarization
and disagreement. This corresponds to an adversarial perspective, which is motivated by recent
developments over the past few years: malicious actors have increasingly been working towards
disrupting networks by increasing disagreement and polarization, thereby destabilizing society [8,
21, 16, 5]. Also, the specific intervention we consider is taking over nodes of a network and modifying
their (innate) opinions.
Note added. While finishing this paper, the paper [11] was posted to arXiv, with similar ideas.
However, their focus is on the special case when society initially has a consensus (i.e., s = 0), and
this is perturbed by an adversary that can modify the entire innate opinion vector. They formalize
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the constraint on the adversary as an L2-norm bound, whereas we use the constraint ‖s′ − s‖0 ≤ k,
which has a clear interpretation in the adversary taking over at most k nodes of the network.
1.4 Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we detail the problem setup for clarity.
In Section 3 we prove Theorem 1.1, and then in Section 4 we prove Theorems 1.2 and 1.3. In
Section 5 we empirically analyze several efficient algorithms and heuristics for the adversary, both
on synthetic networks generated according to common probabilistic models and on Twitter and
Reddit data sets. We conclude in Section 6 with discussion and questions for future work.
2 Problem setup
In this section we detail the problem setup for clarity. We fix a weighted graph G = (V,E,w) which
represents the social network. Let n = |V | denote the number of vertices (we often write [n] for
the vertex set) and let m = |E| denote the number of edges. For convenience we define the weight
function on all pairs of nodes, with 0 < wi,j ≤ 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and wi,j = 0 otherwise. We also set
wi,i = 0 for all i ∈ V .
Let di =
∑
j∈V wi,j denote the (weighted) degree of node i and let D be the diagonal matrix
with entries d1, . . . , dn on the diagonal. Let A denote the (weighted) adjacency matrix of G, with
Ai,j := wi,j for i, j ∈ V . Let L = D − A denote the weighted combinatorial Laplacian of G, which
we refer to just as the Laplacian of G. Finally, let ~1 denote the all-ones vector.
Opinion dynamics. Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ [0, 1]n denote the vector of innate opinions. In
the Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion dynamics [10], agents interact with each other as time goes
on, updating their opinions to be a weighted average of their innate opinion and the neighboring
agents’ opinions. Formally, if z
(t)
i denotes the opinion of node i at time t (where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}),
then initially z
(0)
i = si and the update for t ≥ 0 is given by
z
(t+1)
i =
si +
∑
j∈V wi,jz
(t)
j
1 +
∑
j∈V wi,j
.
As t→∞, the vector of opinions converges to an equilibrium vector z that satisfies
z = (I + L)−1 s, (2.1)
where I is the n× n identity matrix.
Disagreement and polarization. Following [15], we study the disagreement D(z) and the
polarization P (z) of a vector of opinions z; see (1.1) and (1.2) for the definitions. Note that since
the equilibrium opinion vector z is a function of the innate opinion vector s, disagreement D and
polarization P can be considered functions of s as well, in which case we will denote them by D(s)
and P (s), respectively. When clear from the context, we may denote these by just D and P . We
also study linear combinations of these two quantities.
The objectives of the adversary. We are now ready to mathematically formulate our original
questions as three optimization problems with varying objective functions. For any weighted graph
G, innate opinions s, and budget k ∈ N, the adversary aims to determine the optimal modified
innate opinion vector s′ according to the following.
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• Problem 1: Disagreement
maximize D
(
z′
)
subject to z′ = (I + L)−1s′,
s′ ∈ [0, 1]n,
||s′ − s||0 ≤ k.
(2.2)
• Problem 2: Polarization
maximize P
(
z′
)
subject to z′ = (I + L)−1s′,
s′ ∈ [0, 1]n,
||s′ − s||0 ≤ k.
(2.3)
• Problem 3: Weighted Sum
maximize P
(
z′
)
+ λ
n
m
D
(
z′
)
subject to z′ = (I + L)−1s′,
s′ ∈ [0, 1]n,
||s′ − s||0 ≤ k.
(2.4)
Note that in (2.4), we introduce λ as a parameter to describe the relative importance of dis-
agreement versus polarization to the adversary. For this weighted sum index, we have scaled
disagreement by |V ||E| =
n
m so that polarization and disagreement are considered with equal weight
and have the same order of growth in our analysis when λ = 1.
3 Convexity and choosing extreme opinions
For all three optimization problems, the set of constraints do not form a convex set due to the
constraint ||s′ − s||0 ≤ k. However, we prove that all of the objective functions are convex in s′,
which implies that s′i ∈ {0, 1} for all vertices i where s′i 6= si.
Lemma 3.1. Disagreement is convex in s′. That is, the function s′ 7→ D (s′) is convex.
Proof. Disagreement can be written in quadratic form as z′TLz′. Noting that I + L is symmetric
and using (2.1), D can be expressed as
D
(
s′
)
= z′TLz′ =
(
(I + L)−1 s′
)T
L
(
(I + L)−1 s′
)
= s′T (I + L)−1 L (I + L)−1 s′.
The Laplacian matrix L is positive semidefinite and symmetric, so L can be written as L = BTB
for some matrix B ∈ Rn×n. Therefore, (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1 = (I + L)−1BTB(I + L)−1 =
(B(I + L)−1)T (B(I + L)−1), so (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1 is also positive semidefinite. Thus we can
write D as a quadratic form in terms of s′, with a positive semidefinite matrix, so D (s′) is convex
in s′.
Lemma 3.2. Polarization is convex in s′. That is, the function s′ 7→ P (s′) is convex.
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Proof. For notational convenience we drop all apostrophes from the notation. For a vector x ∈ Rn
let x˜ := x− x~1 denote the centered vector. With this notation we have P (z) = z˜T z˜.
Observe that L~1 = 0, and so (I + L)~1 = ~1 and (I + L)−1~1 = ~1. Using (2.1) this implies that
z = 1nz
T~1 = 1nz
T (I + L)−1~1 = 1ns
T~1 = s. In words, the mean equilibrium opinion is the same as
the mean innate opinion. This, in turn, implies that z˜ = (I + L)−1s˜. With this notation we have
that
P (z) = z˜T z˜ = s˜T
(
(I + L)−1
)2
s˜.
For a vector x ∈ Rn define f(x) := xT
(
(I + L)−1
)2
x and g(x) := x − x~1 = x˜. Note that(
(I + L)−1
)2
is positive semidefinite, since it is the square of (I + L)−1, which is positive semidef-
inite and symmetric. This implies that f is convex, since it is a quadratic form with a positive
semidefinite matrix. Note also that for any two vectors x, y ∈ Rn and α ∈ [0, 1] we have that
g(αx+ (1−α)y) = αg(x) + (1−α)g(y). Therefore the convexity of P = f ◦ g follows directly from
the convexity of f .
An immediate consequence of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 is that any conical combination of disagree-
ment and polarization is convex in s′. This is because convexity is preserved by scaling with a
positive constant, as well as across addition.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 show that the adversary’s optimization problem is a
convex maximization problem in s′. Moreover, if G has no isolated vertices then this is a strictly
convex maximization problem. Therefore any coordinate of s that is changed in s′ must be changed
to an extreme: 0 or 1.
4 Bounds on network disruption
In this section we prove Theorems 1.2 and 1.3. We start with a preliminary lemma which gives
a bound on the L1-norm of difference between the modified equilibrium opinion vector z
′ and the
original equilibrium opinion vector z.
Lemma 4.1. Let s be the original innate opinion vector and let s′ be the modified innate opinion
vector, satisfying ‖s′ − s‖0 ≤ k. Let z and z′ be the respective equilibrium opinion vectors. Then∥∥z′ − z∥∥
1
≤ k.
Proof. By (2.1) we have that
∥∥z′ − z∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥(I + L)−1 (s′ − s)∥∥∥
1
≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
a=1
∣∣∣(s′a − sa) (I + L)−1ia ∣∣∣ = n∑
i=1
n∑
a=1
∣∣s′a − sa∣∣ (I + L)−1ia ,
where the inequality is due to the triangle inequality and the final equality is because the entries of
(I + L)−1 are nonnegative. Without loss of generality, assume that nodes 1, . . . , k comprise the set
of nodes taken over by the adversary. Since si ∈ [0, 1], we must have |s′i − si| ≤ 1 for all i. Thus
∥∥z′ − z∥∥
1
≤
n∑
i=1
k∑
a=1
∣∣s′a − sa∣∣ (I + L)−1ia ≤ n∑
i=1
k∑
a=1
(I + L)−1ia .
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Now interchanging the order of summation we have that
n∑
i=1
k∑
a=1
(I + L)−1ia =
k∑
a=1
n∑
i=1
(I + L)−1ia =
k∑
a=1
1 = k.
Here we used the fact that the column sums of (I + L)−1 are all equal to 1, which follows from the
fact that (I + L)−1~1 = ~1 (shown in Section 3) and that (I + L)−1 is symmetric.
4.1 Bound on the increase in polarization
Proof of Theorem 1.2. We first rewrite P ′ in a way to make P appear. This can be done by adding
and subtracting under the square, and then expanding the square:
P ′ =
n∑
i=1
(
z′i − z′
)2
=
n∑
i=1
(
z′i − zi + zi − z + z − z′
)2
= P +
n∑
i=1
(
z′i − zi
)2
+ n
(
z − z′)2 + 2 n∑
i=1
(
z′i − zi
)
(zi − z)
+ 2
n∑
i=1
(
z′i − zi
) (
z − z′)+ 2 n∑
i=1
(zi − z)
(
z − z′) . (4.1)
Since
∑n
i=1 (zi − z) = 0, the last term in (4.1) is zero. Since
∑n
i=1 (z
′
i − zi) = n (z′ − z), the first
term in (4.1) is equal to −2n (z − z′)2. Plugging this back into the display above we obtain that
P ′ = P +
n∑
i=1
(
z′i − zi
)2
+ 2
n∑
i=1
(
z′i − zi
)
(zi − z)− 2n
(
z − z′)2 . (4.2)
The last term in (4.2) is nonpositive, so we may drop it. For the first sum in (4.2), note that
zi ∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ [n], so (z′i − zi)2 ≤ |z′i − zi|. Together with Lemma 4.1 this shows that∑n
i=1 (z
′
i − zi)2 ≤ k. Finally, for the other sum in (4.2), using the bound |zi − z| ≤ 1 we have that∑n
i=1 (z
′
i − zi) (zi − z) ≤
∑n
i=1 |z′i − zi| ≤ k. Altogether this shows that P ′ ≤ P +3k as desired.
4.2 Bound on the increase in disagreement
Proof of Theorem 1.3. We start by rewriting D′ in a way to make D appear. This can be done
by adding and subtracting under the square, and then expanding the square. In the following all
summations over i and j go from 1 to n, so we do not write this out further.
D′ =
∑
i,j
wi,j
(
z′i − z′j
)2
=
∑
i,j
wi,j
(
z′i − zi + zi − zj + zj − z′j
)2
= D +
∑
i,j
wi,j
{(
z′i − zi
)2
+
(
z′j − zj
)2
+ 2
(
z′i − zi
) (
zj − z′j
)
+ 2 (zi − zj)
(
z′i − zi + zj − z′j
)}
.
We now bound the four sums above. The first two sums are equal by symmetry, and we have that∑
i,j
wi,j
{(
z′i − zi
)2
+
(
z′j − zj
)2}
= 2
∑
i,j
wi,j
(
z′i − zi
)2
= 2
∑
i
di
(
z′i − zi
)2
≤ 2dmax
∑
i
∣∣z′i − zi∣∣ ≤ 2dmaxk,
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where we used Lemma 4.1 for the last inequality and the fact that |z′i − zi| ∈ [0, 1] in the inequality
before that. Next, using the inequality (z′i − zi)
(
zj − z′j
)
≤ |z′i − zi| we have that
2
∑
i,j
wi,j
(
z′i − zi
) (
zj − z′j
) ≤ 2∑
i,j
wi,j
∣∣z′i − zi∣∣ ≤ 2dmaxk.
Finally, we use the bound (zi − zj)
(
z′i − zi + zj − z′j
)
≤ |z′i − zi|+
∣∣∣z′j − zj∣∣∣ to obtain that
2
∑
i,j
wi,j (zi − zj)
(
z′i − zi + zj − z′j
) ≤ 2∑
i,j
wi,j
(∣∣z′i − zi∣∣+ ∣∣zj − z′j∣∣)
= 4
∑
i,j
wi,j
∣∣z′i − zi∣∣ ≤ 4dmaxk.
Putting everything together we obtain that D′ ≤ D + 8dmaxk as desired.
5 Algorithms for the adversary
In this section, we first discuss several efficient algorithms and heuristics for the adversary to select
vertices and set their opinions. We then present results of their performance on synthetic networks
generated according to three common probabilistic models: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs, the pref-
erential attachment model, and the stochastic block model. Finally, we evaluate the heuristics on
the Twitter and Reddit data sets used by [15].
5.1 Algorithms and heuristics
We present six adversarial heuristics that are designed under varying levels of information available
about the network structure and opinions. We start with a natural greedy algorithm, and then
turn to other simpler heuristics.
Greedy Algorithm. In light of our analysis on convexity, we propose an efficient greedy
algorithm for selecting s′. In this algorithm, we maintain a set Ω of vertices that have already
been selected by the adversary, whose modified opinion values are reflected in our update of s′. In
each iteration i, we select a vertex and set its opinion to 0 or 1 to result in the greatest increase
in the objective function, given that the last i− 1 opinions have already been picked and modified
according to this algorithm. We then add this vertex to Ω, update s′, and repeat this method
a total of k times. If no modification results in an increase in the objective function at the ith
iteration, with i < k, then we stop the procedure. Algorithm 1 describes in pseudocode our greedy
heuristic for determining s′, which can be used on any of our three objective functions using the
notation f ∈ {P,D, P + λ nmD}.
To compute any value of f , we need the matrix (I + L)−1, which is calculated once at the
beginning of the algorithm. This takes O(n2.3727) time using optimized Coppersmith-Winograd-
like algorithms [20]. Excluding this one-time inevitable computation, the runtime of Algorithm 1
is O(nk). In comparison, a brute force algorithm would have runtime of O ((nk)2k): there are (nk)
subsets of k vertices to modify, and since each vertex has two choices due to Theorem 1.1, there
are 2k choices for setting opinions.
Other Heuristics. While Algorithm 1 may seem to be the method most in accordance with our
problem setup, it requires us to calculate f(s(i)) with each element of s(i) changed to 0 and then 1.
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Algorithm 1 Greedy heuristic for budgeted disruption maximization
procedure Greedy(f ∈ {P,D, P + λ nmD}, s)
s′ = s
F ′ = f(s′)
Ω = ∅
for i = 1 to k do
s(i) = s′
j∗ = argmax
j /∈Ω
max
a∈{0,1}
{f(s(i)) : s(i)j = a}
a∗ = argmax
a∈{0,1}
{f(s(i)) : s(i)j∗ = a}
s
(i)
j∗ = a
∗
if f(s(i)) ≥ F ′ then
s′j∗ = a
∗
F ′ = f(s′)
Ω = Ω ∪ {j∗}
else
break
return s′
This algorithm requires full knowledge of the Laplacian L—and thus the full graph G—and the
network’s innate opinions s. This may not be practically feasible. We hence explore several other
heuristics, applicable for any of the three objective functions, that are computationally simpler and
may be possible for the adversary to use even with limited information. We set up each heuristic
with the same notions of Ω and s′, and each heuristic has two separate parts—picking the vertex
and then setting the opinion—that are invoked at each iteration from 1 to k.
• Mean Opinion: First, we select the index j∗ such that
j∗ = argmax
j /∈Ω
∣∣∣s′j − 1n
n∑
i=1
s′i
∣∣∣.
In words: among opinions that have not been changed yet, we choose the vertex whose opinion
is closest to the current network’s average opinion to be j∗. Second, we must change the
opinion of s′j∗ to 0 or 1. To do this, we optimize and set s
′
j∗ = a
∗ = argmax
a∈{0,1}
{f(s′) : s′j∗ = a}.
Note that the first step of the heuristic, which involves a larger decision space than the
second, does not require any knowledge of the network structure or L, which can be the case
in practice when edges are unknown; e.g. hiding a followers or friends list. Furthermore, if the
adversary only has a rough idea of the vertices’ opinions on average, this heuristic is intuitive
- pick a “centrist” vertex with the most neutral opinion. The case when the adversary does
not even have sufficient information about deciding the opinion a∗ leads us to define the next
heuristic.
• Mean Opinion (randomized): This heuristic is similar to the Mean Opinion heuristic,
except the second step is replaced with randomly picking s′j∗ to be equal to 0 or 1 with
equal probability. This procedure can thus be entirely performed without knowledge of the
underlying graph.
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• Max Degree: First, we select the index j∗ such that
j∗ = argmax
j /∈Ω
n∑
i=1
1 {wi,j > 0}
In words: we choose our vertex to be the one that is connected to the most other vertices in
the network. Second, we set a∗ = argmax
a∈{0,1}
{f(s′) : s′j∗ = a}, as in Mean Opinion.
Note that the first step of this heuristic, in contrast with Mean Opinion, does not require
any knowledge of the innate opinion vector s but rather exploits the network structure in a
simple way. This heuristic is practical for adversaries that have access to the graph underlying
the social network but may not have the means or data necessary to deduce what the opinions
in the network are.
• Max Weighted Degree: This heuristic is similar to Max Degree, except in the first step
we choose j∗ whose sum of edge weights is the largest:
j∗ = argmax
j /∈Ω
n∑
i=1
wi,j
• Random: First, we select an opinion j∗ /∈ Ω to change uniformly at random. Second, we set
s′j∗ to either 0 or 1 with equal probability. This completely random algorithm offers a natural
baseline to compare against.
5.2 Synthetic Experiments
We evaluate the heuristics defined in Section 5.1 over synthetic networks generated using three prob-
abilistic models: the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, the preferential attachment model [4], and the stochastic
block model [1]. The goal is to examine the empirical increase in disagreement and polarization
that can be created by adversarial disruption in a variety of networks. Our empirical results show
that several of the heuristics are able to increase the disagreement, polarization, and weighted sum
of a network linearly in the budget k, which is the same order of growth as the upper bounds in
Theorems 1.2 and 1.3.
Our empirical method is as follows. For each of the three models, we generate a network with
n = 1000 vertices. Weights on the edges are randomly set to be values in (0, 1] (and nonedges have
zero weight). We experiment with k in the range 0 ≤ k ≤ n/2, assuming it is unrealistic for an
adversary to be able to change the opinions of more than half of the network. For each iteration
until n/2, we plot the disagreement, polarization, and weighted sum when the adversary disrupts
the network according to the six heuristics presented.
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model. In the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model every pair of nodes is connected independently
with some probability p ∈ [0, 1]. This model serves as a natural null model for random graphs, with
no underlying structure. In Figure 2 we take p = 0.2; other values of p show qualitatively similar
behavior. We set the innate opinion vector s to have i.i.d. values which are uniformly distributed
in [0, 1].
Our results of the adversary determining s′ using the heuristics are shown in Figure 2. We
observe that all three objective functions are increasing roughly linearly in k, with Algorithm 1
(greedy heuristic) performing the best. We also see that Mean Opinion and Mean Opinion
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(Randomized), the two heuristics that exploit the innate opinion vector, are better than Max
Degree and Max Weighted Degree, which exploit network structure. In fact, the latter two
heuristics only appear slightly better than Random for all three objectives.
Figure 2: Performance of network disruption heuristics under the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model with p = 0.2.
Preferential attachment model. More realistic networks can be constructed with the prefer-
ential attachment process [4]. While the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph serves as a natural null model
for a network with no structure, the preferential attachment process instead follows the natural
concept that vertices that are more connected will receive more edges in the future. This is often
true in social networks; for instance, new accounts on a social media platform are perhaps more
likely to follow a popular account rather than a less known one. While the degree distribution of
an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph is binomial, preferential attachment graphs have a power-law degree
distribution, which is often observed in real-world networks. We choose to generate a network
using a preferential attachment process with parameter m = 5, meaning that at each time step,
a new vertex is connected to m existing nodes with a probability proportional to the degree of
existing vertices. We again set the innate opinion vector s to have i.i.d. values which are uniformly
distributed in [0, 1].
Our results are shown in Figure 3. Relatively, the greedy algorithm still has the best perfor-
mance, followed by Mean Opinion and Mean Opinion (Randomized) for the k defined in the
synthetic experiments, and all heuristics seem to scale linearly in this range of k. We observe,
however, that while Max Degree and Max Weighted Degree start out worse than pure ran-
domization, they appear eventually to surpass Random and increase at a rate faster than other
heuristics. Lastly, we observe that the scale of the objectives is significantly larger to start with
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than our results in Figure 2 using the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, perhaps due to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph
being much denser.
Figure 3: Performance of network disruption heuristics under the preferential attachment model
with m = 5.
Stochastic block model. The stochastic block model [1] is able to represent planted clusters,
unlike the prior two models. These sorts of communities often arise in social networks, as seen
in the Twitter data set [15] which we further discuss in Section 5.3. We define two communities
by partitioning V into two sets C1 and C2, each of size n/2. Let the connectivity within both
communities have parameters p11 = p22 = 0.7, that is, vertices within the communities share an
edge with probability 0.7 (independently across pairs), and let the connectivity between the two
communities have parameter p12 = 0.1. Moreover, these communities often have different opinion
distributions. Therefore, in our model we set the innate opinions sv for v ∈ C1 to be independent
draws from the Beta(5, 2) distribution, while the opinions of sv for v ∈ C2 are i.i.d. Beta(2, 5).
This means that opinions in C1 are biased towards 1, and opinions in C2 are biased towards 0.
Experiments with different parameters show similar qualitative behavior as those discussed below.
Our results are shown in Figure 4. Similar to the two previous results, the greedy algorithm and
Mean Opinion perform the best across the three objectives, increasing linearly in k. However,
Random actually decreases the value of all three, and Mean Opinion (Randomized) decreases
for polarization and the weighted sum. We predict that this is because choosing between 0 and 1
heavily depends on which community j∗ is in due to how the innate opinions are generated using
two beta distributions rather than just a uniform distribution over [0, 1].
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Figure 4: Performance of network disruption heuristics under the stochastic block model with
p11 = p22 = 0.7, p12 = 0.1.
5.3 Analysis of Reddit and Twitter data sets
We now evaluate our proposed heuristics on two real data sets used in [15]. These data sets, one
on Twitter and one on Reddit, contain the edgeset for the social networks as well as the list of
opinions of the users. They were originally collected by [6] by tracking interactions between users
and using NLP techniques to map text to opinions.
Twitter. This network has n = 548 vertices and m = 3638 edges, where the vertices represent
the individuals tweeting over a certain time period about a debate on the Delhi legislative assembly
elections of 2013 (identified by a set of hashtags), and their opinions correspond to sentiment of
the tweets. Each edge is an undirected interaction between users.
Our results are shown in Figure 5. Algorithm 1 (greedy heuristic) and Mean Opinion still
have the largest increases in all three objectives for this real data set. On the other hand, Mean
Opinion (Randomized) and Random perform poorly, with Max Degree and Max Weighted
Degree eventually outperforming the former two for all three objectives. This relative ordering
of heuristic performance is similar to that of the stochastic block model discussed previously. In
fact, when the Twitter edgeset is visualized, we can see that there are two main communities, and
a third smaller and less dense community. Therefore, we can attribute a lot of the performance
results to the community structure. However, the distribution of innate opinions does not follow
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two beta distributions, but instead roughly is a normal distribution with mean 0.602 and standard
deviation 0.08, which mitigates the decrease in performance that results from randomly setting a∗
amid beta-distributed opinions.
Figure 5: Performance of network disruption heuristics on a Twitter data set [15].
In Table 1, we list the exact values for disagreement, polarization, and their weighted sum of
the Twitter network when the adversary uses the greedy algorithm, at the start of the algorithm
(k = 0) and when k is equal to 20, 50, 100, 200. This table suggests that, even if the adversary can
only change the opinions on 20 accounts (approximately 3.6% of the nodes), the disagreement in
the network increases by over 4 times, while the polarization and weighted sum increase by over 7
times.
Objective Original k = 20 k = 50 k = 100 k = 200
Disagreement 0.48 2.12 4.17 6.81 11.20
Polarization 0.29 2.34 3.89 6.70 15.05
Weighted Sum 0.37 2.66 4.48 7.59 16.54
Table 1: Values of objective functions for the Twitter data set under greedy heuristic (Algorithm 1)
at k = 0 (original), 20, 50, 100, and 200.
Reddit. This network has n = 556 vertices and m = 8969 edges, where the vertices represent
individuals who have posted in a politics subreddit, and their opinions correspond to sentiment
in this subreddit over a certain time period. There is an edge between users if they both post in
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at least two other same subreddits. We also discard three vertices from this graph that are not
connected to any other vertices, as keeping these vertices implies that heuristics can simply change
these opinions to yield large increases in polarization without any consequences for the opinion
dynamics.
Our results are shown in Figure 6. Again, the greedy algorithm performs best, with a large
increase especially for small k. While the graphs for polarization and for the weighted sum have
very noticeable jumps, for all three objectives Mean Opinion, Mean Opinion (Randomized),
and Random perform similarly. We conjecture that random is not the worst in this case for two
reasons: firstly, the Reddit data set’s opinions roughly follow a normal distribution with mean 0.498
and standard deviation 0.04, meaning that the values are more tightly concentrated around a very
neutral opinion than the Twitter data set. Moreover, the distribution of degrees of the vertices
is more uniform than that of the Twitter data set, which appears to follow a power law instead,
suggesting that arbitrarily choosing a vertex and then randomly setting its opinion can still result
in good performance.
Figure 6: Performance of network disruption heuristics on a Reddit data set [15].
In Table 2, we list the exact values for disagreement, polarization, and their weighted sum of
the Reddit network when the adversary uses the greedy algorithm at the start of the algorithm
(k = 0) and when k is equal to 20, 50, 100, 200. This table suggests that, even if the adversary can
only change the opinions on 20 accounts (approximately 3.6% of the nodes), all objectives are able
to increase roughly tenfold.
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Objective Original k = 20 k = 50 k = 100 k = 200
Disagreement 0.09 1.14 2.00 2.88 4.09
Polarization 0.07 0.72 0.88 0.98 1.09
Weighted Sum 0.08 0.79 0.99 1.15 1.33
Table 2: Values of objective functions for the Reddit data set under greedy heuristic (Algorithm 1)
at k = 0 (original), 20, 50, 100, and 200.
6 Conclusion and discussion
Our primary conceptual contribution in this paper is the introduction of a new, adversarial model
of network disruption, detailed in the Introduction and illustrated in Figure 1. We investigated this
model both theoretically (Sections 3 and 4) and empirically (Section 5). The key take-away from
our results is that an adversary can significantly increase disagreement / polarization, even using
simple, unsophisticated methods. This motivates further research into addressing these challenges.
We conclude by highlighting some specific and some broad questions that our paper leaves open.
• Hardness of optimal network disruption? As mentioned in the introduction, we con-
jecture that solving the optimization problem of the adversary is computationally hard when
k is large. Recent work of Gionis, Terzi, and Tsaparas [12] on a related opinion maximiza-
tion problem uses a reduction to vertex cover to show hardness; see also [2] where this proof
is adapted to another setting. Adapting this proof to our setting is challenging due to the
different nature of our objective function, coupled with the opinion dynamics whose effect is
difficult to isolate.
• Performance guarantees for the adversary? In Section 5 we investigated empirically
the performance of several natural algorithms for the adversary, on several different random
graphs, as well as on Reddit and Twitter data sets. While performances varied, depending
on the algorithm and the underlying social network, one thing that they all had in common
was a linear growth in the objective function, as a function of the budget k. Is it possible to
prove such a performance guarantee?
• Other opinion dynamics? We focused here on the Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion
dynamics, but everything we discussed can be studied under other models. How robust are
the results to such changes?
• Defense strategies? Our empirical results in Section 5 show that the adversary does not
have to be sophisticated in order to significantly disrupt the network. This highlights the
need to think carefully about defense strategies that can counteract network disruption. For
instance, is it possible to tackle network disruption by modifying the network itself (e.g., by
carefully suggesting new edges to add)?
References
[1] Emmanuel Abbe. Community detection and stochastic block models: recent developments.
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 18(1):1–86, 2017.
[2] Rediet Abebe, Jon Kleinberg, David Parkes, and Charalampos E Tsourakakis. Opinion dy-
namics with varying susceptibility to persuasion. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining, pages 1089–1098, 2018.
18
[3] Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow. Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2):211–236, May 2017.
[4] Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si and Re´ka Albert. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science,
286(5439):509–512, 1999.
[5] Ryan L Boyd, Alexander Spangher, Adam Fourney, Besmira Nushi, Gireeja Ranade, James
Pennebaker, and Eric Horvitz. Characterizing the Internet Research Agencys Social Media
Operations During the 2016 US Presidential Election using Linguistic Analyses. Preprint
available at https://psyarxiv.com/ajh2q/, 2018.
[6] Abir De, Sourangshu Bhattacharya, Parantapa Bhattacharya, Niloy Ganguly, and Soumen
Chakrabarti. Learning a linear influence model from transient opinion dynamics. In Proceedings
of the 23rd ACM International Conference on Conference on Information and Knowledge
Management, CIKM 14, page 401410, New York, NY, USA, 2014. Association for Computing
Machinery.
[7] Morris H DeGroot. Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
69(345):118–121, 1974.
[8] Facebook. An Update On Information Operations On Facebook. Available online at https:
//about.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update/, September 2017.
[9] Adam Fourney, Miklos Z Racz, Gireeja Ranade, Markus Mobius, and Eric Horvitz. Geographic
and Temporal Trends in Fake News Consumption During the 2016 US Presidential Election.
In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Information and Knowledge Management
(CIKM), pages 2071–2074. ACM, 2017.
[10] Noah E Friedkin and Eugene C Johnsen. Social influence and opinions. Journal of Mathemat-
ical Sociology, 15(3-4):193–206, 1990.
[11] Jason Gaitonde, Jon Kleinberg, and Eva Tardos. Adversarial perturbations of opinion dynam-
ics in networks. Preprint available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07010, 2020.
[12] Aristides Gionis, Evimaria Terzi, and Panayiotis Tsaparas. Opinion maximization in social
networks. In Proceedings of the 2013 SIAM International Conference on Data Mining, pages
387–395. SIAM, 2013.
[13] Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. Selective Exposure to Misinformation:
Evidence from the consumption of fake news during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.
Preprint available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf, 2018.
[14] Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz. Opinion exchange dynamics. Probability Surveys, 14:155–
204, 2017.
[15] Cameron Musco, Christopher Musco, and Charalampos E Tsourakakis. Minimizing polar-
ization and disagreement in social networks. In Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web
Conference, pages 369–378, 2018.
[16] United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (USHPSCI). Exposing Rus-
sias Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements. Avail-
able online at https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/default.aspx,
2018.
19
[17] Alexander Spangher, Gireeja Ranade, Besmira Nushi, Adam Fourney, and Eric Horvitz. Anal-
ysis of Strategy and Spread of Russia-sponsored Content in the US in 2017. Preprint available
at https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.10033, 2018.
[18] Eugenio Tacchini, Gabriele Ballarin, Marco L Della Vedova, Stefano Moret, and Luca de Alfaro.
Some Like it Hoax: Automated Fake News Detection in Social Networks. In 2nd Workshop
on Data Science for Social Good, pages 1–15, 2017.
[19] Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. The spread of true and false news online. Science,
359(6380):1146–1151, 2018.
[20] Virginia Vassilevska Williams. Multiplying matrices faster than Coppersmith-Winograd. In
Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 12,
page 887898, New York, NY, USA, 2012. Association for Computing Machinery.
[21] Julia Carrie Wong. Facebook says nearly 50m users compromised in huge security breach.
The Guardian. Available online at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/sep/
28/facebook-50-million-user-accounts-security-berach, September 2018.
20
